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RECENT CASES
INDIANS-RESERVATIONS-JURISDICTIONAL EFFECT OF SURPLUS LAND
STATUTE UPON TRADITIONAL BOUNDARIES OF AN INDIAN RESERVATION.
Plaintiff was an enrolled member of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux
Indian Tribe. Her children, also members of the Tribe, were placed
in foster homes by order of the defendant district county court.1 Ap-
proximately one-half of the incidents leading to the court ordered
placement occurred on non-Indian patented lands within the origi-
nal boundaries of the Lake Traverse Indian Reservation.2  Plain-
tiff petitioned the Circuit Court of Roberts County for a Writ of Ha-
beas Corpus, alleging that the state lacked jurisdiction to issue the
order because the incidents upon which it was based took place in
"Indian country. '" The writ was denied 4  and the plaintiff ap-
pealed to the South Dakota Supreme Court. The supreme court
ruled5 that the unallotted lands6 of the reservation had been sold
to the United States by the Congressional Act of 1891.7 The land
1. The plaintiff had placed one child for adoption and the other child was separated
from her through neglect and dependency proceedings in the District County Court for the
Tenth Judicial District of South Dakota.
2. The Lake Traverse Indian Reservation (also known as the Sisseton-Wahpeton In-
dian Reservation) is located partly in northeastern South Dakota and partly in south-
eastern North Dakota. The reservation was created by the Treaty of February 19, 1867,
with the Sisseton and Wahpeton Tribes, 15 Stat. 505. By the Act of March 3, 1891, ch.
543, 26 Stat. 989, 1035, the Sisseton-Wahpeton Tribe agreed to sell to the United States
all the unallotted lands within the 1867 reservation boundaries.
3. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1970) defines "Indian country" as:
(a) [A]II land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the Juris-
diction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any
patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all
dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States whether
within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether
within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the
Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way
running through the same.
4. Unpublished Opinion of September 26, 1972, the IHonorable Philo Hall, Circuit Court
of Roberts County of the State of South Dakota.
5. DeCoteau v. District County Ct. for Tenth Jud. Dist., 87 S.D. - , 211 N.W.2d 848
(1973).
6. Unallotted lands are those lands originally in an Indian reservation which were not
allotted to an Indian, or if they were so allotted at one time, such Indian title has since
been extinguished. (Concepts of allotment are discussed in text accompanying notes 20-23
infra.) For jurisdictional purposes, the difficulty arises in determining whether these
unalloted lands are within or without a reservation as the particular reservation is de-
fined today.
7. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 543, 26 Stat. 989, 1035 (hereinafter referred to as the Act
of 1891). This Act ratified a previously negotiated agreement entered into in 1889 by the
Sisseton-Waahpeton Sioux Indians and the United States. Article I of the Act provides:
The Sisseton and Wahpeton bands of Dakota or Sioux Indians hereby
cede, sell, relinquish, and convey to the United States all their claim, right,
title, and interest in and to all the unallotted lands within the limits of the
reservation set apart to said bands of Indians as aforesaid remaining after
the allotments and additional allotments provided for in article four of this
agreement shall have been made.
Id. at 1036 (emphasis added).
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thus acquired by the United States was separated from the reserva-
tion and returned to the public domain, and could not be considered
as "Indian country." 8 As a result the state of South Dakota was
deemed capable of exercising jurisdiction over criminal and civil
acts committed by Indians thereon.9
Less than two months later, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit overruled a previous case when it held in a separate ac-
tion that the Act of 1891 had no effect on the Lake Traverse In-
dian Reservation boundaries.' 0 Consequently the unallotted lands
within these boundaries were found to be "Indian country,"". and
thus the state had no jurisdiction to try Indians for criminal acts
committed therein.
The two cases were consolidated on appeal to the United States
Supreme Court in order to resolve the conflict and to ascertain the
correct status of unallotted lands within the Lake Traverse In-
dian Reservation. 12 In affirming the state court and reversing the
circuit court, the Supreme Court held that the Lake Traverse In-
dian Reservation was terminated by the Act of 1891, when the un-
allotted lands were returned to the public domain, and that since
that time the lands have not retained reservation status. There-
fore, state courts have jurisdiction over Indian conduct occurring
on non-Indian lands within the original reservation boundaries. De-
Coteau v. District County Court For Tenth Judicial District, 420
U.S. 425 (1975).
In recent years, both federal and state courts have been faced
with the difficult task of determining the effect of particular sur-
plus land statutes's upon the original boundaries of Indian reser-
8. 'Indian country" is defined at note 9 supra.
9. Jurisdiction over Indian conduct is divided between the tribe, the federal govern-
ment. and the states. To aid In determining which body is to have jurisdiction In a par-
ticular situation, Congress in 1948 enacted the definition of "Indian country". See note 3
supra. Under this definition if the lands In question are within a continuing reservation,
jurisdiction Is in the tribe and the federal government. 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (1970). On
the other hand, if the lands are not within a continuing reservation, jurisdiction is in the
state, except for those land parcels which are "Indian allotments, the Indian titles to
which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same."
18 U.S.C. § 1151(c) (1970). DeCoteau v. District County Ct. for Tenth Jud. Dist., 420 U.S
425, 427 n.2 (1975). For a general discussion of criminal and civil jurisdiction over In-
dians, see F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 358-82 (GPO ed. 1945).
10. United States ex rel. Feather v. Erickson, 489 F.2d 99 (8th Cir. 1973). Appellants
were ten enrolled members of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Indian Tribe imprisoned in
the state penitentiary of South Dakota. They instituted habeas corpus proceedings against
the warden of the penitentiary, asserting that the state lacked jurisdiction to prosecute
them for crimes committed on non-Indian lands within the 1867 boundaries of the Lake
Traverse Indian Reservation, because such lands remained "Indian country" under 18
U.S.C. § 1151 (1970).
The result reached in this case expressly overruled DeMarrias v. State of South
Dakota, 319 F.2d 845 (8th Cir. 1963). The reservation boundaries had been questioned in
earlier litigation also: DeMarrias v. State of South Dakota, 206 F. Supp. 549 (D.S.D.
1962) ; State v. DeMarrias, 79 S.D. 1, 107 N.W.2d 255 (1961), cert. denied 368 U.S. 844;
Application of DeMarrias, 77 S.D. 294, 91 N.W.2d 480 (1958).
11. "Indian country" is defined at note 3 supra.
12. Cert. granted, 417 U.S. 929 (1974).
13. As used herein, the term "surplus land statutes" refers toalI types of congressional
acts involving the sale of, or the opening up for homesteading of, Indian lands or surplus
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vations. 4 The issue in these cases has not been who has jurisdic-
tion over lands (Indian or non-Indian lands) which are definitely
within the geographical borders of an Indian reservation.15 Rather,
the cases represent an attempt to clarify the jurisdictional conflict
that arises when the actual boundaries of a reservation are in
doubt-in doubt because unallotted Indian lands within the original
reservation boundaries were directly opened to homesteading or
sold to the United States for such purpose. Under these surplus
land statutes, two drastically different results (at least as far as
reservation boundaries are concerned) are possible. First, the re-
servation boundaries may remain the same, the only change wrought
by the statute being in the total Indian-held acreage within the re-
servation boundaries. 16 The second possible result is that the re-
servation boundaries are geographically diminished to include only
those lands allotted to the Indians. All unallotted lands sold to the
United States or opened to homesteading directly are no longer
"Indian country" for jurisdictional purposes.' 7 The difficulty fac-
ing the courts is in deciding which of these two possible effects a
particular statute had on a particular reservation's boundaries. Com-
pounding this difficult determination is the dissimilarity of the lan-
guage used in the various surplus land statutes enacted by Congress.
Surplus land statutes were not the first means employed by the
United States to obtain land from the American Indian."' Prior to
1880, by treaty or agreement establishing a reservation, an Indian
tribe often agreed to outright cession of certain lands to the United
States in return for a sum certain consideration.'9 This pattern of
outright cession was altered by the passage of the General Allot-
ment Act of 1887.20 This Act provided that each Indian residing with-
lands after all Indians on a particular reservation have received their prescribed allot-
ments. A complete list of such statutes enacted by Congress between 1887 and 1913 is
available from the National Indian Law Library, 1506 Broadway, Boulder, Colorado 80302.
14. See, e.g., New Town v. United States, 454 F.2d 121 (8th Cir. 1972) ; Rosebud Sioux
Tribe v. Kneip, 375 F. Supp. 1065 (D.S.D. 1974) ; Cook v. State, - S.D.- , 215 N.W.2d
832 (1974) ; State v. Molash, 86 S.D. 558, 199 N.W.2d 591 (1972).
15. The state is without jurisdiction in these areas, under the ruling in Kills Plenty v.
United States, 133 F.2d 292, 294 (8th Cir. 1943). The rule was later codified in 18 U.S.C.
§ 1151 (1970). See the discussion in note 9 supra.
16. This is the position most favorable to, and usually advanced by, Indian tribes. See,
e.g., Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 851 (1962); United States ex. rel. Condon v.
Erickson, 478 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1973) ; State v. Molash, 86 S.D. 558, 199 N.W.2d 591
(1972).
17. This is a position taken by many of the states, since the effect would be to give
them jurisdiction over the surplus lands of many of the various reservations. See, e.g.,
Cook v. Parkinson, 396 F. Supp. 473 (D.S.D. 1975) ; State v. Williamson, -S.D.-,
211 N.W.2d 182 (1973) ; State v. Moss, 471 P.2d 333 (Wyo. 1970).
18. See generally F. COHEN, HIANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 294', 334-36 (GPO
ed. 1945).
19. Id. at 334 n.521.
20. Act of February 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, as amended by the Act of May 8,
1906, ch. 2548, 34 Stat. 182. The Act, also known as the Dawes Act, was the impetus behind
Congress passing surplus land statutes in the next several decades. It was hoped that
tribal ownership of land could be eliminated and that Indians would become integrated
with the Whites settling on the unalloted lands within the reservation. For an excellent analy-
sis of the rationale and effect of the General Allotment Act, see D. OTIs, THN DAwxs
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in an existing reservation was to receive a specific allotment of
land therein. 21 The Act further provided for the purchase and re-
lease of that portion of the reservation not allotted to the Indians-
in other words, the sale or opening up of the surplus lands.2 2 This
was to be done at the discretion of the President and ratified by
Congressional Act.2
The surplus land statutes took several different forms, based
upon the different operative language used in each, and the method
of payment employed in the various acts. 24 In several acts 5 it was
provided that the Indian tribe agreed to "cede, sell, relinquish, and
convey" the land to the United States for a sum certain considera-
tion. The lands were then distributed to non-Indian homesteaders.
In other surplus lands acts, 26 the terms "cede, grant and relinquish"
were used to describe the transfer, but in these acts the United
States was to act as a trustee of the proceeds received from non-
Indian homesteaders on the lands, instead of purchasing the lands
outright from the tribes. In a third type of surplus land acts, 27 the
Secretary of the Interior was authorized "to sell and dispose of all
the surplus unallotted and unreserved lands." Here again, the
United States did not purchase the lands outright, but instead acted
as trustee of the proceeds as they were received from individual
non-Indian buyers. The lands involved in the fourth category were
declared "subject to settlement, entry, and purchase.
' 28
On three separate occasions since 1962, the United States Su-
preme Court has been asked to determine the jurisdictional conse-
quences of particular surplus land statutes.2 9 In Seymour v. Super-
intendent,30 the Court ruled that the Congressional Act of 1906,"'
AcT AND THE ALLOTMENT OF INDIAN LANDS (1973) ; See also F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FED-
BRAT INDIAN LAw 78-79, 207-17 (GPO ed. 1945).
21. Act of February 8, 1887, ch. 119, § 1, 24 Stat. 388.
22. Act of February 8, 1887, ch. 119, § 5, 24 Stat. 388, 989.
23. Id.
24. See generally F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 294, 334 (GPO ed.
1945) ; Sonosky, State Jurisdiction over Indians in Indian Country, 48 N.D.L. REv. 551, 553
(1972). See also Comment, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Non-Trust Lands Within The Limits
of Indian Reservations, 9 WILLIAMETTE L.J. 288, 292 (1973).
25. E.g., Lake Traverse Reservation, Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 543, 26 Stat. 989, 1035,
construed in DeCoteau v. District County Ct. for Tenth Jud. Dist., 420 U.S. 425 (1975);
Yankton Sioux Reservation, Act of August 15, 1894, ch. 290, 28 Stat. 286, construed in
State v. Williamson, -S.D.-, 211 N.W.2d 183 (1973).
26. E.g., Devils Lake, North Dakota, Act of April 27, 1904, ch. 1620, 39 Stat. 319; Rose-
bud Sioux Reservation, Act of April 23, 1904, ch. 1484, 33 Stat. 254, construed in Rosebud
Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 521 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1975).
27. E.g., Fort Berthold Reservation, Act of June 1, 1910, ch. 264, 36 Stat. 455, construed
in New Town v. United States, 454 F.2d 121 (8th Cir. 1972) ; Rosebud Stoux Reservation,
Act of May 30, 1910, ch. 260, 36 Stat. 448, construed in Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip,
521 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1975) ; Cheyenne River and Standing Rock Reservations, Act of May
29, 1908, ch. 218, 35 Stat. 460, construed in United States ex. rel. Condon v. Erickson, 478
F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1973).
28. E.g., Kiamath River Reservation, Act of June 17, 1892, ch. 120, 27 Stat. 52, construed
in Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973).
29. DeCoteau v. District County Ct for Tenth Jud. Dist., 420 U.S. 425 (1975) ; Mattz
v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973) ; Seymour v. Superintendent, 868 U.S. 351 (1962).
30. 368 U.S. 351 (1962).
31. Act of March 22, 1906, ch. 1126, 34 Stat. 80. This Act opened the "South Half" of
414
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which opened all unallotted lands in the diminished Colville Reser-
vation3 2 to homesteading, did not dissolve the reservation, and thus
the state courts had no jurisdiction therein. The Court found that
[t]he act did no more than open the way for non-Indian
settlers to own land on the reservation in a manner which
the Federal Government . . . regarded as beneficial to the
development of its wards.33
In Seymour, the Court adhered to the standard established in United
States v. Celestine:34 "When Congress has once established a re-
servation all tracts included within it remain a part of the reserva-
tion until separated therefrom by Congress."35 In Seymour there
was no evidence that Congress had taken such action in passing
the surplus land Act of 1906.36
The Celestine standard relied upon in Seymour was refined by
the Supreme Court in Mattz v. Arnett," wherein it stated that "[a]
congressional determination to terminate [reservation status]
must be expressed on the face of the Act or be clear from the sur-
rounding circumstances and legislative history."38 Utilizing this
standard, the Court in Mattz reached the same result as it had in
Seymour. The Congressional Act3 opening the unallotted lands of
the Indian reservation did not terminate that reservation, and it
therefore remained "Indian country
' 40 for jurisdictional purposes.
41
However, the Mattz Court utilized a much different approach than
that used in Seymour. Whereas the Court in Seymour made no re-
ference to the surrounding circumstances and legislative history of
the 1906 Act,4 2 the Mattz decision was replete with such informa-
tion43 concerning the surplus land act" there in issue. It is from
this intensive analysis that the Court concluded that the Act of
the Colville Indian Reservation in the state of Washington to homesteading, by authoriz-
ing the sale and disposition of the surplus of unallotted lands therein.
32. The Colville Reservation referred to in the Act of 1906 was called the diminished
reservation or "South Half" because an earlier Act, the Act of July 1, 1892, ch. 140, 27
Stat. 62 had restored the "North Half" of the Colville Reservation to the public domain,
but it had no effect on the "South Half."
33. 368 U.S. at 356.
84. 215 U.S. 278 (1909).
85. Id. at 285.
36. 368 U.S. at 359.
37. 412 U.S. 481 (1973).
38. Id. at 505 (emphasis added).
39. Act of June 17, 1892, ch. 120, 27 Stat. 52. The statute dealt with the Kiamath In-
dian Reservation located in the state of California.
40. "Indian country" is defined at note 3 supra.
41. 412 U.S. at 506.
42. Act of March 22, 1906, ch. 1126, 34 Stat. 80.
43. The opinion began with a detailed history of the reservation and congressional ac-
tion which had affected it. 412 U.S. at 485-94. The court then analyzed the surplus lands
act in question and included an extensive examination of its congressional history to
ascertain the congressional purpose in passing the Act. Id. at 496-504.
44. Act of June 17, 1892, ch. 120, 27 Stat. 52.
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189245 did not employ clear termination language, and that it was




Using the Mattz test, the DeCoteau Court found that the face
of the Act, the surrounding circumstances, and the act's legislative
history, conclusively showed that the Lake Traverse Indian Reser-
vation was terminated in 1891.4 7 Each of these three aspects of the
Mattz test was extensively analyzed by the Court in DeCoteau.4 1
The Court emphasized that the principles of statutory construction
regarding termination of reservations established in Celestine, and
those set forth in Seymour and Mattz remained binding.4 9 The Court
pointed out that adherence to these principles in ascertaining con-
gressional purpose in passing a particular surplus land statute does
not require uniformity of result.
The Court of Appeals thought that a finding of termina-
tion here would be inconsistent with Mattz and Seymour.
This is not so. We adhere without qualification to both the
holdings and the reasoning of those decisions. But the gross
differences between the facts of those cases and the facts
here cannot be ignored.
5 0
The Court distinguished Mattz on basically two grounds: the gross
differences in the terms of the Acts involved and the differences
in circumstances surrounding congressional passage of each Act.
5 1
Seymour was likewise distinguished because of the great difference
in the terms of each of the respective Acts involved.
5 2
The DeCoteau Court emphasized three very important points in
45. Id.
46. 412 U.S. at 504.
47. 420 U.S. at 445.
48. (1) The Face of the Act-The Sisseton-Wahpeton agreement was only part of the
Act of 1891. The Court not only discussed the articles of that agreement at length, but
also compared and analyzed its wording in relation to the seven other agreements rati-
fied in the Act. Id. at 436-42.
(2) The Surrounding Circumstances-The Court summarized the history of the
reservation since its creation in the Treaty of February 19, 1867, with the Sisseton and
Wahpeton Tribes, 15 Stat. 505. Id. at 431. It also discussed the temper of the time and
the forces at work upnn the reservation. Id. at 431-32. The negotiations with the tribe
which led to the agreement and subsequent Act of 1891 are examined through contempor-
aneous documents of the sessions. Id. at 432-36.
(3) The Legislative Histor-The legislative history of the Act as it is set forth -in
the Congressional Record and Senate and I-ouse Committee Reports was extensively exam-
ined. Id. at 437-42. In this context, the Court also discussed the jurisdictional hIstor* of the
area since the Act of 1891. Id. at 442-44.
49. Id. at 444. Some of these principles are: the Court will not lightly conclude. that a
reservation has been terminated, United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 285 (1909) ;
congressional intent must be clear to overcome the general rule that doubtful expressions
are to be resolved in favor of the Indians, McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm., 411
U.S. 164, 174 (1973); congressional intent to terminate must be expressed on the face
of the Act or be clear from the legislative history and surrounding circumstances, Matte
v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 505 (1974) ; reservation status may survive the mere opening of
a reservation to settlement, Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S: 351 (1962).
50. 420 U.S. at 447.
51. Id. at 447-48.
52. Id. at 448-49.
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reaching its decision. First, the results reached in cases involving
reservation boundary disputes based on various surplus land statutes
may vary. Secondly, the paramount concern in settling these dis-
putes is ascertaining the congressional intent in passing the surplus
land statute involved. Thirdly, congressional intent is ascertained
only after an intensive analysis of the circumstances surrounding
the passage of the Act and of legislative materials.5 3 The impor-
tance of these considerations becomes apparent when contrasting
decisions 54 rendered prior to DeCoteau with the case of Rosebud
Sioux Tribe v. Kneip 5  a post-DeCoteau decision. The earlier de-
cisions realized the necessity of ascertaining congressional intent,
but were ultimately decided through adherance to earlier case law,
in which other considerations were deemed paramount, and little
if any emphasis was placed on the legislative history or surrounding
circumstances of the acts in question.58 Exemplary of this approach
was the 1972 decision by the Eighth Circuit in New Town v. United
States,57 in which the court ruled 8 that the Congressional Act of 191059
had no effect on the boundaries of the Fort Berthold Indian Reser-
vation in North Dakota, therefore land considered subject to state
jurisdiction for many years was deemed "Indian country.16 0 The
court emphasized the importance of ascertaining congressional in-
tent in passing the Act of 1910, yet the decision did not cite any
legislative history or specific examples of such intent.61 The Court
53. Id. at 444-49.
54. Although there have been relevant decisions In other jurisdictions, see, e.g., United
States v. Washington, 496 F.2d 620 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied 419 U.S. 1032 (1975);
Ellis v. Page, 351 F.2d 250 (10th Cir. 1965); State v. Moss, 471 P.2d 333 (Wyo. 1970),
most of the case law has been concentrated within the Eighth Circuit, and particularly in
North and South Dakota. See, e.g., United States ex. rel. Feather v. Erickson, 489 F.2d
99 (8th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 420 U.S. 425 (1975); New Town v. United States, 454 F.2d 121
(8th Cir. 1972); State v. Molash, 86 S.D. 558, 199 N.W.2d 591 (1972); State ex. rel.
Swift v. Erickson, 82 S.D. 60, 141 N.W.2d 1 (1966) ; State ex. rel. Hollow Horn Bear v.
Jameson, 77 S.D. 527, 95 N.W.2d 181 (1959) ; State v. Sauter, 48 S.D. 409, 205 N.W. 25
(1925).
55. 521 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1975). This case Is discussed in the text accompanying notes
63-67 infra.
56. See generally the cases listed in note 54 supra.
57. 454 F.2d 121 (8th Cir. 1972); accord, United States ex. rel. Feather v. Erickson,
489 F.2d 99 (8th Cir. 1973) ; United States ex. rel. Condon v. Erickson, 478 F.2d 684 (8th
Cir. 1973). In Condon, the court concluded that "resort to the applicable contemporaneous
and subsequent legislative history is not helpful." 478 F.2d at 688-89. Likewise, in United
States ex. rel. Feather v. Erickson, 489 F.2d 99 (8th Cir. 1973), the Eighth Circuit con-
cluded:
[T]he body of legislative documents concerning the Lake Traverse Reserva-
tion does not, against the glare of Seymour and the more recent judicial
guidance in Mattz, Condon, and New Town, demonstrate congressional In-
tention to disestablish the reservation.
Id. at 102. Although in two footnotes the court cited several congressional reports, it ap-
parently did not feel that these reports shed any light as to congressional intent to dis-
establish the reservation. Id. at 102 nn.6-7.
58. 545 F.2d at 127.
59. Act of June 1, 1910, ch. 264, 36 Stat. 455.
60. "Indian country" Is defined in note 8 supra.
61. This case has been criticized because the result was reached without reliance on
the legislative materials in determining congressional intent. Comment, New Town. et. al:
The Future of an Illusion, 18 S.D.L. Rxv. 85 (1973). But see Smith, New Town et al:
A Reply, 18 S.D.L. Rev. 327 (1973).
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pointed to the similarity between the Act of 1910 and the Act
involved in Seymour, and that its determination was made in light
of the earlier principles espoused by the Supreme Court.
62
In Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip,63 decided after DeCoteau, the
Eighth Circuit attempted to ascertain the congressional intent in
enacting the surplus land statutes involved by intensively analyzing
all materials pertinent to the legislation.6 4 The glare of precedent
which seemed so important in cases such as New Town was given
limited importance. 65 The opinion itself is an extensive documenta-
tion of the congressional histories and circumstances surrounding
the passage of the Acts involved.6 6 After this in depth analysis,
the court concluded that the congressional intent in passing the Acts
was clearly to diminish the reservation by opening the lands for
settlement to non-Indians.6'
The significance of DeCoteau is not that the results in earlier
cases such as New Town may be contrary to those in recent cases
such as Rosebud. The significance is the way those results have
been determined in recent cases. DeCoteau has clearly shown that
to determine the effect a particular statute had on reservation
boundaries, the courts must not rely on general principles of In-
dian law in ascertaining congressional intent. That determination
must be made only after an exhaustive search of the legislative his-
62. 454 F.2d at 125. Instead of relying on the legislative history and circumstances sur-
rounding the passage of the act of 1910, the New Town court placed primary reliance on the
following principles: (1) When Congress has once established a reservation, all tracts in-
cluded within it remain a part of the reservation until separated therefrom by Congress.
United States v. Celesttne, 215 U.S. 278, 285 (1909). (2) The purpose to abrogate treaty
rights of Indians is not to be lightly imputed to Congress. Menominee Tribe of Indians v.
United States, 391 U.S. 404, 418 (1968). (3) The opening of an Indian reservation for
settlement by homesteading is not inconsistent with its continued existence as a reserva-
tion. Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962).
For an analysis of New Town, see 49 N.D.L. Rxv. 410 (1973). See also note '61
eupra.
63. 521 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1975). This case affirmed the memorandum decision of Bogue,
District Judge, in Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. KnEip, 875 F. Supp. 1065 (D.S.D. 1974). The
tribe, In a declaratory Judgment action, sought a judicial declaration that three surplus
land statutes (The Act of May 30, 1910, ch. 260, 36 Stat. 448; The Act of March 2, 1907,
ch. 2536, 34 Stat. 1230; The Act of April 23, 1904, ch. 1484, 33 Stat. 254) did not diminish
the Rosebud Sioux Indian Reservation in South Dakota, or alter its boundaries, and that
the state was without jurisdiction therein. The district court, however, did not agree with
the tribe, and ruled that the reservation boundaries were diminished by the surplus land
acts involved. Accord, United States ex. rel. Cook v. Parkinson, 396 F. Supp. 473 (D.S.D.
1975), which dealt with the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation, also located in South Dakota.
64. The materials the court found relevant included debates on the legislation, official
correspondence pertaining to the legislation, administrative treatment of the area, and
information placing the Acts in their proper historical context, such as the social forces
at work in the area, and in particular the great demand for land on the part of white
settlers which necessitated opening the reservation to homesteading and settlement). 521
F.2d at 91.
65. In the words of the court:
In view of the many authorities cited to us, we deem it pertinent to note
at the outset that they are of limited utility and we comment only on those
deemed relevant to decision herein.
Id. at 89 (emphasis added).
66. The court reviewed the pressures for opening the reservation, the legislative his-
tories of the Acts in question, their contents, provisions, contemporaneous construction,
and subsequent treatment and interpretation. Id. at 113-14.
67. Id. at 114.
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tory and surrounding circumstances of each act. Since each surplus
land statute and the reservation it affected must be individually
analyzed under the DeCoteau rationale, it appears that litigation
will continue until the boundaries of reservations affected by each
surplus land statute have been determined. Many earlier decisions
in which in-depth analyses of congressional intent were not per-
formed will undoubtedly be relitigated. This is of particular signifi-
cance to states such as North Dakota, 6 where cases involving sur-
plus land statutes prior to DeCoteau were decided with little if any
reference to the congressional history and surrounding circumstances
of the surplus land statute involved.6 At least in DeCoteau, courts
have been provided with the guidance needed to determine the ef-
fect a particular surplus land statute had on the boundaries of the
reservation involved.
JAMES M. BEKKEN
INDIANS-JURISDICTION-INDIVIDUAL CONSENT To STATE JURISDICTION
By RESERVATION INDIAN INEFFECTIVE.
In December, 1971, an automobile accident occurred on a North
Dakota state highway within the boundaries of the Fort Totten Indian
Reservation. The non-Indian plaintiff commenced an action against
the defendant, an enrolled member of the Turtle Mountain Band of
Chippewa Indians, in state district court. Subsequent to commence-
ment of the action, the defendant signed a document consenting to th(
68. North Dakota, on behalf of itself and nine other states, filed a brief Amici Curiae
for the respondent state court in DeCoteau. Brief for the state of North Dakota et. ar.
as Amici Curiae, DeCoteau v. District County Ct. for Tenth Jud. Dist., 420 U.S. 425
(1975). (The nine states were California, Idaho, Iowa, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Mexico, Wisconsin, and Washington). In its brief, the State of North Dakota noted:
These States have all experienced the difficult nagging problems of the
questionable status of certain geographical areas which were at one time In
alan Reservations but later were deemed non-reservation areas and recently
designated as Indian reservations again. This creates a monumental problem
with law enforcement and also with the status of lands within the area par-
ticularly for the non-Indian landowners.
Id. at 1.
The Indian tribe's counterargument centers around their right of sovereignty and
a desire to have jurisdiction remain in the tribe. This right of self-government was the
paramount concern in Justice Douglas' dissent in DeCoteau v. District County Ct. for
Tenth Jud. Dist., 420 U.S. 425, 460-68 (1975).
69. Although the case must be analyzed on its own merits, there are several factors In
the recent Rosebud decision which iay be of significance In the determination of whether
New Town will be relitigated In the near future: (1) Rosebud is the first Eighth Circuit
case to extensively examine legislative history and circumstances--New Town, wherein the
result was opposite of that in Rosebud, made little use of such information. (2) One of
the acts (Act of May 50, 1910. ch. 260, 36 Stat. 448) interpreted In Rosebud was passed
by Congress only two days before the Act of June 1, 1910, ch. 264, 36 Stat. 455 involved
in New Town. (3) The provisions of these two acts are very similar though not identical.
(4) The state of North Dakota's concern over the present status of surplus lands opened
on reservations. See note 68 supra.
